PORT vs. UNITED STATES.

river, to the prejudice of our public improvements, as a wrong
inflicted upon Pennsylvania, of which our State has great reason to
complain, and which she is entitled to insist upon having redressed.
I am, very respectfully,
Yours, &c.,
THOS. E. FRANKLIN,
Attorney General.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
In the United States Court of Claims.
J. ALEXIS PORT vs. THE UNITED STATES.

1.In all cases of the sale of personalty, there is an implied warranty of title.
2. Where the United States, while at war with Mexico, seized and sold certdn
tobacco as enemy's property, which subsequently proved to be otherwise, the
purchase money paid by the vendee can be recovered.
3. The authority of military commandels in time of war considered.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
GicHRIST, C. J.

-The

facts in this case, as they are stated

on the 12th day of September, 1847,
in the petition, are -that,
Colonel Childs, the officer commanding at Puebla, ordered Captain
Webster to "sell at auction some captured tobacco, and dispose of
the proceeds as he will be hereafter directed." In obedience to this
order, Captain Webster advertised, on the 16th of October, for
sale, at auction, on the 19th of October, five hundred bales of
tobacco. On the 21st day of October the claimant purchased the
tobacco for the price of twenty-five dollars per bale, amounting to
the sum of $12,000, for which he paid $8,000 in cash, and gave
the United States credit for $4,000, they being then indebted to
him for supplies furnished the army.
The first question that arises is, what are the rights and liabilities of the claimant and the United States, after the sale of the
tobacco and the payment of the price by the claimant.
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In this case there were all the elements necessary to constitute a
contract. The Uinited States and Mexico were at war. The American army was in actual possession of a considerable portion of
Mexico, and, by the law of nations, had a right to seize the property of the Mexican government as lawful prize. Colonel Childs
had, for the time being, supreme civil and military authority in the
military department of Puebla, and in his then existing capacity
he represented the United States, whose officer and servant he was.
His authority, as the head of the army, could not be resisted; for
this was especially a case where, from necessity, the laws must be
silent in the presence of a victorious army.
The principles regulating the rights of nations at war, when an
army is in possession of an enemy's country, are clearly established
by the writers on the law of nations. "When the sovereign or
ruler of a State declares war against another sovereign, it is understood that the whole nation declares war against another nation."
* * "Hence, these two nations are enemies, and all the subjects
of the one are enemies to all the subjects of the other." Yattel,
b. 3, ch. 5,§ 70. "Everything, therefore, which belongs to that
nation, to the State, to the sovereign, to the subjects, of whatever
age or sex-everything of that kind, I say, falls under the description of things belonging to the enemy." Ibid. § 73. "We have a
right to deprive our enemy of his possessions, of everything which
may augment his strength, and enable him to make war." Ibid.
b. 3, ch. 9, § 161. "As towns and lands taken from the enemy
are called conquests, all movable property taken from him comes
under the denomination of booty. This booty naturally belongs to
the sovereign making war, no less than the conquests, for he alone
has such claims against the hostile nation as warrant him to seize
on her property, and convert it to his own use." Ibid. § 164.
"The property of movable effects is vested in the enemy from the
moment they come into his power." Ibid. b. 8,ch. 13, § 196. As
to movables captured in a land war, it has been sometimes stated
to be merely requisite that the property shall have been twentyfour hours in the enemy's hands; but other writers hold that the
property must have been brought infra prcesidia- that is, within
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the camps, towns, ports, or fleets of the enemy; and others have
drawn lines of an arbitrary nature. Marten's Law of Nations, 290,
291; 2 Wooddes, Vin. L. 444, § 34. But, in respect to maritime
captures, a more absolute and certain species of possession has been
required, in order to obviate the right of postliminum, such as a
sentence of condemnation, to give a neutral purchaser a title to a
prize vessel.. Case of the .lad Oyen, 1 Rob. 134; 8 T. R. 270.
"Immovable possessions, lands, towns, provinces, &c. become the
property of the enemy who makes himself master of them; but it
is only by the treaty of peace, or the entire submission and extinction of the State, to which those towns and provinces belonged,
that the acquisition is completed, and the property becomes stable
and perfect." Vattel, b. 3, ch. 13, § 197. The conqueror who takes
a town or province from his enemy cannot justly acquire over it
any other rights than such as belonged to the sovereign against
whom he has taken up arms. War authorizes him to possess himself of what belongs to his enemy; if he deprives him of the sovereignty of that town or province, he acquires it, such as it is, with
all its limitations and modifications. Ibid. § 199.
In a condition resulting from a state of war, if property be seized
under an erroneous supposition that it belongs to the enemy, it may
be liberated by the proper authorities; but no action can be maintained, in a court of law, against the party who has taken it. In
England no municipal court, whether of common law or of equity,
cantake cognizance of any questions arising out of hostile seizure.
Le Caux vs. Eden, 2 Dougl. 573. So, if booty be taken under the
color of military authority by an officer under the supposition that
it is the property of a hostile State or of indivialuals which ought
to be confiscated, no municipal court can judge of the propriety or
impropriety of the seizure; it can be judged of only by an authority delegated by his Majesty, and by his Majesty ultimately,
assisted by the Lords in Council. There are no direct decisions on
such questions, because, as was stated by Lord Mansfield, in Lindo
vs. Rodney, Dougl. 818, they are cases of rare occurrence. Le
Caux vs. Bden, Dougl. 592.
It is to be remembered that we are now examining this case upon
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the supposition that the allegations in the petition are true, and the
general question is, whether, supposing them to be true, a proper
case is presented for the taking of testimony. The United States
were in possession of a quantity of tobacco captured from the
enemy during the war with Mexico. Under this general question,
the first inquiry is, whether, when a person sells personal property
in his possession, there is an implied warranty that he has a title
to such property.
In most of, if not all, the cases in this country, wherever the
question has been raised, it has been held that in every sale of personal property, there is an implied warranty of title. Some of the
decisions to this effect are, Defreeze vs. Trumper, I Johns. 274;
Bayard vs. Malcom, ibid. 469; Bew vs. Barber, 3 Cowen, 280;
Case vs. .all, 24 Wend. 102. In TIibbard vs. Johnson, 19 Johns.
78, it is said: "There isno doubt that in every sale of a chattel
for a sound price there is a tacit and implied warranty that the
vendor is the owner, and has a right to sell." In Coolidge vs. Brigham, 1 Mete. 551, the court said: "In contracts of sale, warranty
is implied. The vendor is always understood to affirm that the
property is his own. This implied affirmation renders him responsible, if the title is defective." In Boyd vs. Bopst, 2 Dall. 91, it
was said by the court: "The possession of, chattels is a strong inducement to believe that the possessor is the owner, and the act of
selling them is such an affirmation of property, that on that circumstance alone, if the fact should turn out otherwise, the value can
be recovered from the seller." There are numerous other cases to
the same effect, which need not be particularly adverted to for the
present purpose. The same doctrine is stated in Story on Contracts, § 535, where numerous English cases are cited by the author
in support of his position.
In 1 Law Reporter United States, 272, there is a careful and
discriminating analysis of the decisions upon this point by Mr. Pike,
of Arkansas, in which the writer comes to the conclusion that the
law of England on this subject is like the civil law, and that there
is an implied warranty, not of title, but of undisturbed possession
and enjoyment. It is immaterial, in the present case, what is the
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precise character of the implied warranty, whether it be one of
title, or of peaceable possession only, because the United States
were not only in possession and sold the property, but it has been
taken from the possession of the purchaser, who is seeking to recover
damages for the breach.
In judicial sales, where property is sold by the marshal under an
order of court, it is held that no warranty is implied. Tie Monte
Allegre, 9 Wheat. 644. But this was not a judicial sale. It was
simply a sale by the United States, acting through their officers in
an enemy's country, of property in their possession, to which they
claimed a title by the rights of war; and we see no reason why
they should stand in any better possession, in regard to property
in their possession, than a private citizen. The sale was in obedience to an order from the commanding general to his military
subordinate. We cannot regard the general as a court of law, or
Captain Webster as an officer of a court; for this would tend to
confound all the distinctions that exist between a state of peace
and a state of war in regard to the rights of property.
If, then, there be nothing in the other facts in the case to alter
or modify.the conclusion, the claimant must be held to have established a right of action against the United States.
But the counsel for the claimant puts his case upon still another
ground. He contends that the tobacco belonged to the United
States by the rights of war and of conquest, that they sold it to
him, and then took it away from him, making him thereby liable in
damages to his vendors.
That; upon the facts stated in the petition, we must consider the
tobacco as property captured in war by the army of the United
States, we think there is no doubt. It was taken by an authority
which, for the time being, was supreme. Mexico, so far as it was
actually occupied by a competent military force, was, for the time,
a conquered country. In the rights of conquest all ordinary civil
jurisdiction and remedies were merged. In all that the commanding officer did, so far as he was justified by the law of nations, he
represented the country by whose authority he was in command of
a military force. It was by this authority, under the law of nations,
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that the tobacco must for the present be considered to have been
captured, also that it was the property of the enemy. When captured, it was not the private property of the captor, but it became
the property of the sovereign, according to Yattel-in this country, of the United States. The people, acting through the only
agents who could, from the necessity of the case, be recognizedthat is, the officers in command - sold it to the claimant, who paid
the consideration for it. It then became is property, and, after
such a sale and payment, the United States had no greater right to
take the property into their possession, without indemnifying those
who might have a claim to it, than any individual would have to
take property from his vendee, on the ground that he had no right
to sell it.
It appears from the petition, that, after the sale of the tobacco,
the petitioner was informed that it was claimed by a merchant of
Puebla, by the name of Domerq, and that a board of inquiry was
.convened by order of General Lane, consisting of four officers of
the army, for the purpose of examining into the matter, a majority
of whom reported that the tobacco was not at the time of the sale
the property of the United States, and they awarded the possession and ownership thereof to Domerq, and that the consideration
paid by the claimant should be returned to him, which was accordingly done. Subsequently, upon its being reported to General Lane
that the last buyer of the tobacco refused to give up the key of the
store-house, an officer and a file of men forcibly seized and delivered
the tobacco to Domerq.
This must be considered as the act of the United States. It
stands on the same ground with the sale of the tobacco. The
United States, through their officers, were in the actual possession
of the supreme civil and military authority. With such a responsibility upon him, the commanding officer must, ex necessitate, act
with promptness and decision. In a state of war, where the ordinary tribunals are silent, a nation must expect to incur the risk of
pecuniary liability for the acts of its officers in a foreign country,
whose course of conduct must be determined by what seems best
under existing circumstances. It would be unreasonable in the
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extreme to require of military officers carrying on war abroad,
placed in difficult and trying positions, either the experience or the
legal skill that would enable them to appreciate the subtle distinctions which at home and in a time of peace are applied to the
ascertainment of legal rights. It is a necessary consequence of a
state of war, that the orders of the general can admit neither of
argument nor resistance. It is the nation that carries on the war,
and not the individual officer; and it follows that the nation must
be liable for the acts of such agents as it sees fit to employ in-the
prosecution of its object.
Oar conclusion is, that if the allegations in the petition are
proved, the claimant is entitled to some damages from the United
States. Whether the claimant is entitled to recover any sum
beyond the consideration paid by him, by reason of his liability to
subsequent vendees, is a question which can more conveniently be
examined when all the evidence relating to damages is laid before
us. At present, we shall merely order testimony to be taken.

In the Surrogate's Court of the City of New York.
HUNT VS. MOOTRIE.'

In the matter of proving the last Will and Testament of BExJ. F. Hu.;T, deceased.
1. Wher the decedent failed to declare to the subscribing witnesses that the paper
which they were called to attest was his last will and testament, but simply
acknowledged his signature, and requested them to sign at a particular place
pointed out by him-Held, that this was not a valid testamentary declaration.
2. The knowledge of the character of the instrument gained by the subscribing
witnesses from looking at the attestation clause, does not constitute a testamentary
declaration by the decedent, unless it was clearly obtained by his request or direction, or at the least, his consent and privity.
3. If anything is to be taken as substitution for an express declaration, it must be
such an act as is clear and unequivocal, and as gives the basis of a necessary
inference that the testator conveyed, intended to convey, and knew he had conveyed to the minds of the witnesses, that he executed the paper as his last will
and testament.
1 We are indebted to the courtesy of Mr. Surrogate Bradford for this interesting
case.
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4. There must be mutuality as to the knowledge of all the parties, testator and
witnesses, in respect to the nature of the transaction, and this must be evinced
with reasonable definiteness by the facts.
5. The declaration must be made to each of the witnesses, at the time of subscribing
or acknowledging, and as part of the transaction; it must be made in the presence
of the parties, and must point to the particular instrument in process of
execution.
6. Wills of real estate are governed, so far as relates to the forms of execution, by
the law of the place where the land is situated.
7. Where the decedent made his will at Charlcston, in South Carolina, where he
then had his domicil, according to the forms prescribed by the laws of that State,
and subsequently removed to the city of New York, where he died-H/eld, that
the will so made was valid as to personalty, though not solemnized in conformity
to the laws of this State.
8. In the continental jurisprudence, the rule that the act is valid if performed according to the lex loci, is universal in respect to a testamentary disposition of
movables.
9. Where the lex loci actus and the lex loci dornicilii are both conformed to, so far as
relates to the forms of the testament, a subsequent change of domicil to a place
where other forms are required, will not invalidate the instrument.
10. The statutes of this State recognize the validity of foreign wills of personalty
made according to the lex loci aclus, and do not admit of a revocation to be effected
by a change of domicil.

D. P. ilall and D. .D. Field, for executor.
William Mootrie, and .
THE SURROGAT.-The

. farrington, for contestants.

will propounded for probate, bears date

the 14th day of August, 1849 ; was executed in the city of Charleston, South Carolina, where the decedent then resided. The petition
for probate states, that the decedent at, or immediately previous to
the time of his death, was an inhabitant of the county of New York.
Assuming that to be the fact, two points arise-first, whether the
will was executed according to the laws of the State of New York;
and secondly, if not, whether if made according to the laws of South
Carolina, it was a valid will at the decedent's death.
The will was attested by three witnesses, and the usual ceremonies
appear to have been performed, except the testamentary declaration,
the proof as to which is alleged to be deficient.
The testimony was at first taken under a commission issued to
Charleston, and subsequently two of the witnesses came to New
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York, and were personally examined before me. Heckmann, one of
the witnesses who was not re-examined, says, he was requested by
the decedent at the time of the execution " to witness his signature
to a paper;" that "he was called upon at that time and place by
Col. Hunt, to witness a paper, but Col. Hunt did not state what it
was;" that "C ol. Hunt acknowledged the signature and seal to the
paper;" "he made no declarations to witness as to what the paper
to which he acknowledged his signature was;" "Col. Hunt said
nothing about his will or witnessing his will." "Col. Hunt said
nothing about the nature or contents of the paper;" that he
"signed the paper without knowing what it was-never knew until
recently told;" "Col. Hunt made no declarations in the presence
of witness-he merely acknowledged his signature, and requested
him to sign as a witness ;" "he heard no declaration from Col.
Hunt." These repeated answers to repeated questions touching a
testamentary declaration, put it beyond all question, if any evidence
can, that no declaration as to the nature or character of the instrument was made to this witness by the decedent. Heckmann also
testifies, that only one other person was present in the office with
Col. Hunt, and that he was not acquainted with that person. He
also says, "he knows nothing" about the signatures of the other
witnesses, and that "1nobody signed it" in his presence.
Mahoney in his testimony under the commission, says he "signed
his name to the paper;" that Messervey requested him to go to
Col. Hunt's office, and he there "signed the paper" in the presence
of the decedent and of Messervey, but cannot remember whether
Heckmann was present-", thinks Messervey said Col. Hunt wished
witness to sign his name as witness to his will, but this statement
was not in the presence of Col. Hunt, and Col. Hunt said nothing
as to what the paper was;" simply acknowledged the signature and
seal, without saying what the paper was;" "thinks that the others
signed at the same time with him;" " knows that he was witness to
some paper or instrument of writing which Messervey had told him
was Col. Hunt's will; but cannot say that Col. Hunt did anything
more than acknowledge the signature and seal, and request the witnesses to sign their names at the places where they are written; "

IHUNT vs. MOOTRIE.

" he did not declare what the paper shown to witness was, he merely
requested him and the others to sign the same as witnesses;" that
"he was in the habit of calling upon witness to act as a subscribing
witness to written instruments, but never told the nature or contents of such papers to witness ;" that " h e knew nothing about the
contents of the paper when he signed it-Col. Hunt said nothing
about them to witness,"-" said nothing to witness as to what the
paper was which he desired him to subscribe." Messervey when
ex.amined under the commission, stated, that he was the clerk of
the decedent-was called into the office where B. F. Hunt was present, and was asked by the decedent to "subscribe his name to the
paper," which he did, there being "no other person present at the
time of his signing;" that "he knew" at the time it was decedent's
will, "but that Col. Hunt did not tell witness it was his will ;" that
he subscribed his name in the presence of the decedent, "but not
in the presence of John Mahoney and Adolph Heckmann, or of
either of them;" that "Col. Hunt acknowledged his seal and signature ; "-that the will is in the handwriting of the decedent ; that
"Col. Hunt was in the habit of calling on him to witness written
instruments, but not of telling him of their nature or contents;
that "C ol. Hunt never did tell him of the nature or contents of
any instrument of writing which witness was ever called upon to
witness; but that he knows from conversations between Col. Hunt
and his son B. F. Hunt, jr., just previous to the execution of the
will and his subscription as a witness, that the will so subscribed,
was the will of Col. Hunt; and also that Col. Hunt knew that witness knew that said instrument was the will of Col. Hunt;" that
"he thinks he was present when Mr. Mahoney signed, at the
request of Col. Hunt-he called Mr. Mahoney to witness the
will."
On the return of the commission under which this evidence was
taken, it seemed to me the testimony disproved a- testamentary
declaration ; but upon its being urged that there was a possibility
of a declaration having been made by the reading of the testatum
clause, I allowed the proponent the opportunity of a further
inquiry.
On his examination before me, Messervey testified, that the
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decedent requested him to go below and get "two witnesses to
the will." This is I think in conflict with his testimony under the
commission. He also says, that Col. Hunt pointed out the spot
where the witnesses were to put their names, and that he acknowledged his signature. Mfesservey further testifies that he the witness read the testatum clause.
Mahoney on being recalled stated, that Messervey, on the day
the will was executed, called on him, and said that Col. Hunt wished
him "to witness his will,"-that on proceeding to the place, the
paper was lying on the table -he looked over it "about a minute,"
-the decedent then stepped up, acknowledged the signature, and
then "pointing his finger to the place where my name is written,"
said, "see here, sign your name there." This witness also says,
he glanced over the attestation clause, and the instrument was a
will. I do not perceive that the case is helped any by these new or
further statements of Messervey and Mahoney. All the witnesses
agree that the decedent did not declare the instrument to be his
will at the time of the execution-that so far as his words are concerned, he used no expression indicative of the nature of the instrument, whether it was a will, deed, or any other document; that he
simply acknowledged his signature, and requested the witnesses to
sign at a particular place pointed out by him. These then were all
the acts performed'by the decedent. The knowledge of th*e character of the instrument gained by the subscribing witnesses from
looking at the attestation clause, does not constitute a testamentary
declaration by the decedent, unless it was clearly obtained by his
request or direction, or at the least, his consent and privity. If
anything is to be taken as substitution for an express declaration, it
must be such an act as is clear, and unequivocal, and as gives the
basis of a necessary inference that the testator conveyed, intended
to convey, and knew he had conveyed to the minds of the witnesses,
that he executed the paper as his last will and testament. There
must be mutuality as to the knowledge of all the parties, testator
and witnesses, in respect to the nature of the transaction. We cannot spell out, and guess at this mutuality. It must be evinced
with reasonable definiteness by the party. There is not enough in
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the proof io satisfy me, that Col. Hunt had reason to know that
the witnesses were aware the paper was his will, or that he wished
them to know that. Messervey, it is true, says, the decedent requested him to go below and procure witnesses to his will, but that
request was made before any one except himself had attested; and
although he may have communicated that request to the other witnesses in the same words, it would not supply the defect of a testamentary declaration to the witnesses in person. The declaration
must be made to each of the witnesses at the time of subscribing or
acknowledging, and as part of the transaction. It must be made
in the presence of the parties, and must point to the particular instrument in process of execution. I am of the opinion, therefore, that
this instrument was not executed in conformity with the provisions
of the statutes of this State. As wills of real estate are governed,
so far as relates to the forms of execution, by the law of the place
where the land is situated, this instrument is not valid so as to
affect lands in the State of New York: and it cannot be admitted
to record as a will of real estate. But the question still remains,
whether it is to be treated as invalid as a will of personalty.
In the State of South Carolina, the formalities requisite to the due
execution of wills, were regulated by the Statute of Frauds, (29 Car. 2
ch. 8; Statutes S. C., vol. 6, p. 882,) until the year 1825, when a
stricter rule was adopted, requiring the instrumeIa to be signed by
the decedent, and to be attested by three witnesses. Statutes S. C.,
vol. 6, p. 238.) At the time of its execution, this will was made in
a form sufficient to carry real and personal estates, according to the
law of the place where it was made, and where the decedent was
then domiciled. It was a good and valid instrument, duly executed
in conformity with the laws which then regulated the act. But a
most interesting question arises as to the effect upon the validity of
this instrument by a change of the decedent's domicil to the State
of New York. I find at the outset the great authority of Justice
Story against the validity of a will, which though made under such
circumstances, does not conform to the law of the testator's domicil at the time of his death. He says, "But it may be asked, what
will be the effect of a change of domicil, after a will or testament is
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made of personal or movable property, if it is valid by the law of
the place where the party was domiciled when it was made, and not
valid by the law of his domicil at the time of his death ?. The laws
in which the general rule is laid down, would seem sufficiently to
establish the principle, that in such a case the will or testament is
void; for it is the law of his actual domicil at the time of his death,
and not the law of his domicil at the time of making his will or
testament of personal property, which is to govern." The distinguished jurist cites John Voet in support of this proposition; but
the passage cited from Voet, relates only to the question of testamentary capacity, and not to the forms of the instrument. The
case he puts is this: if one living in Holland, where a testament
may be made at fifteen years, should make his testament, and then
changed his domicil to Utrecht, where full puberty (eighteen years)
is required in a male testator-his testament as to movables would
be rendered void by the change. The same thing would occur, he
says, if one should institute his wife heir in a country where that
was lawful, and then change his domicil to a place where it was not
lawful. It is manifest that the observations of Voet touch only
upon the point of testamentary capacity, and not upon the forms
and solemnities required for the valid execution of a testament. It
is impossible, indeed, he should have intended to apply the rule as
to the effect of a change of domicil, to testamentary forms; for he
himself is one of the strongest supporters of the doctrine that in
respect to forms, locus regit actum, and in sustaining it, he has
gathered a most formidable array of authorities. (Voet, De Statutis, lib. 1, §§ 13, 14, 15.) Ile shows, that it is a rule of universal
recognition, even as against the lex domicilii, unless indeed, it appears that the la* of the domicil has been avoided by fraud. He
says distinctly on this very case :-Adeoque si Hollandus in Hollandid de pra'diis Ultrajectinis testamento disyonat, effectum sortiri debet voluntas ejus, quia observavit solennia loci in quo actus
testandi celebratus fuit. Nec infirmabitur ex co guod forte post
conditurn ita in Hollandidxupremum elogium Ultrajectum migret;
eilm enim peregrini CU,? slis in Hollandid reperti, ibique more
ilollandico testantis, volunta8 etiam post reditum in patriam rata
26
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maneat, si nihl aliud impediat iniquum foret, migratione sold ad
locum alia solennia desiderantem, interrumpi actum in prioris
domieilii loco solenniter ante celebratum.-(Liber 28, tit. 1, § 27:
qui test. fac. poss.) It would be unjust, he says, that a will executed in Holland according to the solemnities there required, should
be broken solely by a change of domicil to a place, whose laws
demand other solemnities. I proceed now to show that this is not
the opinion of Voet alone. Van Leeuween, commenting upon the
subject, has this passage,-" Hence this question has arisen
whether a will made according to the practice required at the
place where it is effected, as in Holland for instance, having
been duly confirmed before a notary and two witnesses, ought
likewise to take effect in other places, where other and more
numerous solemnities are required, as in Friesland the number of witnesses required is seven, * * and upon the general
opinion of the doctors, it was understood that a will confirmed at a
certain place according to the solemnities required there, takes effect
everywhere without distinction,- because the solemnity required to
the existence of anything, belongs to the knowledge and jurisdiction
of the government of that place where it ought to be observed.
And if a person be obliged to follow the practice of different places,
any person who lives now at this and then at another place, would
be obliged to make so many wills, or to observe different forms in
one and the same will; and a will, which is but a single act, would
be judged of according to different forms of law." (Com. p. 215.)
Grotius says; " Ubi de formd sive solemnitate testamenti agitur
respici locum conditi testamenti. (Epis. 467, in 4 Burge. Coin. p.
220.) Dumoulin states the rule very broadly-" Est omnium doctorum sententia ubicunque consuetudo vel statutum locale disponit
de solemnitate velformd actu2s, ligarietiam exteros, ibi actum illumr
gerentes, et gestur esse validum et efficacem ubique, etiam super
bonis soli extra territorium consuetudinis vel statuti." Dumoulin
cited Story's Confl. Laws, § 441. M. Toullier says,-" Enfin il
faut observer que la forme des testaments ne ddpend ni de la loi du
domicile du testateur, ni de celle des biens qui sont donngs, ni de
celle du temps oji le testateur vient d d6cder. .Elle ne depend que
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de la loi du lieu et du temps de la ronfetion die testament." (Le
droit Civil Franqais, vol. 5, p. 290, § 882.) Thus Dumoulin
declares, that by the consent of all the learned, the local custom
governs the form of the act; and M. Toullier, that the form does
not depend upon the law of the testator's domicil, nor of the situs
of the goods, nor of the time of the testator's death, but upon the
law of the place, and of the time of the execution of the will. l.
Duranton also states, that the form of the testament is regulated
by the law of the time when it was made, and shows that in this
respect the rule differs from that which prevails in regard to the
testator's capacity. (Cours de droit Franqais, vol. 9, p. 15, § 14,
15, 16.) M. Felix in his Conflict of Laws, says,-" Un principe
aujourd' hui g~nzralement adoptg par l'usage des nations, e'est q7te
laforme des aetes est regl~e par les lois du lieu dans lequel ils sent
faits o?Ipassds."-6onflit des Lois, cited by Story, Confl. of Laws
and note, p. 727.) Merlin defines the following distinctions, "in
regard to testaments, there are three things to consider-the capacity of the person, the disponobility of the good, and the form of
the disposition. The first is governed by the law of the domicil, the
second depends upon the situation of the goods, and the third is
governed by the law and custom of the place where the disposition
is made." He adds, "it is needless to recall the disputes which
were raised upon this point by the old civilians-it is many years
since they were finished; and now "-" tout le monde convient
unanimement quelaforme de tester depend du statut, ou de la ecoutume du lieu oi l'om teste." All the world agree unanimously that
the form of making the testament depends on the law, or the custom of the place where it is made. (Rdpertoire Universel et
raisonn6 de Jurisprudence6, vol. 84, p. 111, Guyot, tom. 16, p. 167.)
In the reasoning of M. De Voisins upon the testament of M. De
Pommereuil, the grounds of this rule are carefully elaborated-such
as the necessity of counsel, the difficulty or impossibility of practising other forms, the ignorance of other forms, the variety of forms,
the necessity of adopting one, and the convenience of adopting that
of the place. He says, "l es nations en sont oonvenues, et elles
vivent aujourd'hui entr'elles sur la foi de cette rigle." (Merlin,
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Pothier speaking on this subject, says,-" The
Art. Testam.)
testament in France, ought to be made in the form prescribed by
the law of the place where it is made, although the testator has not
his domicil in that place, and was there only temporarily,-that
although there would appear to be more difficulty in regard to testaments made by a Frenchman in a foreign country-foreign law not
being received in France; nevertheless, "njanmoins les arrets les
ontjug&s valables: parce que c'est une regle du droit des 9ens de
se conformer, pour laforme des actes, aux lois du lieu oil on les
passe"-they have been adjudged valid, because it is a rule of the
law of nations to conform in respect to the forms of acts, to the law
of the place where they are effected. (Euvres de Pothier ; Nouvelle
edition, par M. Dupin. tom. 10. Coutumes, tit. 16, §§ 2, 5, 11. I
suppose it impossible to find a single authority among the Continental jurists of the highest character impeaching the doctrine sustained
by the authors l, have cited, so far as it applies to movables. M.
Felix criticises the opposing opinions of three modern authors who
question the rule, with entire success. Besides the authorities I
have quoted, Yattel, Sande, Peckius, Paul Voet, Christinmas,
Rodenburg, Vinnius, Boullenois, Bouhier, and lluberus agree to
the principle, and most of them press its application even to immovable property. It is recognized in the codes of Louisana, France,
the two Sicilies, and Sardinia; and is the law of Spain, Holland and
Germany. (Jurisprudence du XIXme si~cle, par M. M. Sirey et
de'illeneuve, pp. 1022-26-40. Code Napol. Art. 99. Concordance entre les Codes Civiles Etrangers etle Code Napoleon, par M.
de Saint Joseph Burge, Com. p. 585.) It has such universal acceptance, that Pothier emphatically styles it a rule of the law of
nations. Thus according with the usage of civilized nations, and
the concurrent opinion and judgment, and enlightened reason of
the most eminent civilians, it remains to consider how far it has
been adopted by the common law. And in this connection it may
be observed, that to adopt the lex loci aerds as to the form of the
will, does not necessarily oppugn the lex domieilii. The law of
the domicil undoubtedly governs in cases of testacy and intestacy,
both alike; but then the inquiry arises, what is the law of the domi-
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cil in the particular case ? The adoption of the lex domicilli, is
itself a concession to foreign law upon principles of public convenienee, national comity, and right reason ; a concession which has been
made, justified, and sustained by an appeal to the common consent of
nations and the authority of jurists. In determining what is the law
of the domicil in any given case, where the local law is not positively
settled by legislation, there would seem to be no good reason why a
similar deference should not be paid to the Jus gentium, and the opinions of learned men. It appears from the authorities I have cited, that
the rule locus regit acturn, has been generally received, perhaps not so
much as an exception to the law of the domicil as a part of that law
itself-so that in the adoption of the lex domicilii in this class of
cases, it may reasonably be inquired why we should not take it with
its universally accepted modifications.
In Potinger vs. Wightrnan, 3 Merivale, 67, on a question of
succession and domicil, and the law of England being silent on the
subject, Sir William Grant observed " on the subject of domicil,
there is so little to be found in our own law, that we are obliged
to resort to the writings of foreign jurists for the decisions of most
of the questions that arise concerning it." It may be well to see
whether the precise point in controversy in the present case, has
been adjudicated in the English or American tribunals. In the
case of the Duchess of Kingston, her will of personal estate, executed at Paris according to the English, but not according to the
French forms, was admitted to probate in the Ecclesiastical Court.
(Cited in Curling vs. Thornton, 2 Add. 21.)
Justice Story
says she was domiciled in France, Mr. B urge, that she had not
relinquished her English domicil ; but probably no stress was laid
on that point, as she had obtained Letters Patent from the French
king, giving her the same power of devising as she would have had
in England. The opinion of M. Turgot in favor of the validity of
the instrument, was based on the supposition of an English domiciland proceeded on the principle, that although the solemnities of the
lex loci actus were not observed, the will would be good if conformed
to those of the domicil.
In Stanley vs. Bernes, 3 Hagg. 373, codicils were rejected,
because not made in conformity with the forms of the Portuguese
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law, which was the lex loci actfls et domicilii. The deceased was
domiciled in Portugal, and the codicils were executed there. This
was the decree of the High Court of Delegates reversing the judgment of Sir John Nicholl. The grounds of the reversal do not
appear ; but in a subsequent case, Sir Herbert Jenner stated, that
the principle decided was, " that if the instrument be not executed
according to the law of the domicil of the testator, it is invalid."
ie says, ,1The Court of Delegates having reversed the sentence of
the Prerogative Court, it follows, (though no reasons are given by
the court for its decision,) that the two coilicils were pronounced
against, on the ground that they were not executed according to the
law of Portugal, where the testator was domiciled." (De Bonneval
vs. De Bunneval, 1 Curteis, 856.) This conclusion is, I think too
broad, for the codicils were not executed according to the lex loci
actus ; and it would be quite as sound a deduction, looking only at
the case itself, to say, that they were rejected for that reason, as
for the other reason. In the case last above cited, the Marquis De
Bonneval left a will executed in England, conformably to the
English law ; but having his domicil in France, Sir Herbert Jenner
determined that the validity of the will must be determined by the
French tribunals, and for that purpose suspended proceedings. In
The Coantess -DeZiclhy Ferrari&
vs. The 111arquis of .lertford, 3
Curteis, 468, the testator left a will and a large number of codicilssome of the codicils were not executed according to the statute, (1
Vict. c. 26,) and one of them was executed at 'Milan, where the
testator frequently resided, and had an establishment. The testator
being domiciled in England, Sir Herbert Jenner Fust held, that this
codicil was invalid, making the following observations :-1" It is not
pleaded that the late Marquis was domiciled at Milan ; it is only
pleaded that he was resident there, as a visitor, as he might have
been in any other country, and therefore merely a temporary resident, having his domicil in this country, and therefore he was
liable to the law of this country with respect to his testamentary
disposition. The law of Austria, it is pleaded, would give effect to
this codicil, as the act of a foreign resident there, and this may be
perfectly true ; but if the law of Austria would give effect to the
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paper, it does not follow that this court could decree probate of the
paper, unless it can be shown that the domicil of the party was in
th6se dominions, and not in the dominions of England, because the
domicil of the Marquis was in England: for it is too late now to
contend that the succession to personal property, either in cases of
testacy or intestacy, is to be governed by any other law than the
law of the country in which the deceased had his domicil. In the
case of succession to the personal estate of an intestate, the cases
are too numerous for the court to entertain any doubt that the succession is governed by the law of the domicil; and if there had
been any doubt whether the succession to personal property in a
case of testacy is governed by the same rule, such doubt would be
removed by the decision of the Court of Delegates, in the case of
Stanley vs. Bernes. It was there decided that a British born subject who had domiciled himself in Portugal, was bound in the disposition of his property, to conform to the law of the country in
which lie had become so domiciled; and although in that case he
had expressed an intention of returning to this country, yet, as he
died in Portugal, a domiciled Portuguese subject, the court held,
that his will could not be valid unless executed according to the laws
of the country in which he was domiciled. Therefore, that case
disposes of the whole question as to succession in cases of testacy,
deciding that a will, to be valid, must be executed according to the
law of the country where the party was domiciled; and following
that decision, I am bound to administer the law as I found it laid
down by the Supreme Court, as the law of the country; and I am
consequently of opinion, that the circumstance of the paper having
been written and executed by the late Marquis at Milan, can give
no effect to the paper, it not being executed according to the law of
the country in which it is admitted lie had his domicil." It thus
appears, that on the authority of Stanley vs. Bernes, where the
codicils were not executed in conformity to the lex loci act as, the
learned judge rejected a codicil which was executed according to the
lex loci actias. In the absence of the reasons of the court in
Stanley vs. Bernes, it is impossible to say what general doctrine
was laid down as applicable to cases of this character, for the facts
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before the court only called for a sentence in rejecting papers which
conformed neither to the law of the domicil nor to the law of the
place where they were executed. It is obvious that the question in
Stanley vs. Bernes, did not arise on a testament made with the
solemnities required by the lex loci actas,; though deficient in
those required by the lex domicilii. (4 Burge, 589., See Curling vs. Thornton, 2 Add. 6; Hare vs. tYas-myth, 2 Add. 25;
Craige vs. Lewin, 3 Curteis, 435 ; Collier vs. Riivaz, 3 Curt. 355 ;
Maltass vs. llaltass, 1 Robert. Ecc. 67.) Nor does it appear in the
case of the Marquis of Ilertford, how far the judgment of the
court would have been affected had the testator been domiciled at
Milan, at the time the codicils were made ; though if the doctrine
inferred from Stanley vs. Bernes be strictly applied, it would seem
to exclude wills executed according to any other forms than those
prevailing by law at the testator's domicil at the time of his decease.
This case was taken before the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council (3 Notes of Cases, p. 150) ; and the decision below affirmed
on the principle, that the English statute of wills, is to be construed
as applying to the testamentary acts of all domiciled Englishmen,
wheresoever done.
I am not aware, however, of but a single decision avoiding a will,
made in pursuance of the forms required by the testator's domicil
at the time it was made, but not in conformity to the solemnities
demanded by the law of his domicil at the time of his death. The effect
of this change of domicil does not appear to have been considered
judicially, save in the case of Nott vs. Coon, 10 Miss. R. 543,
where it was determined, that a will made in another State by a
person then a resident of such State, but who afterwards removed
to Missouri, and died a resident thereof, was invalid, not being made
according to the law of Missouri. The grounds of this judgment
do not appear-nor whether the will related to real estate or to
personal. In Desesbat vs. Berquier, 1 Binney, 336, the decedent
was an inhabitant of St. Domingo, at the time of making the will
and at the time of his death; and the instrument though sufficient in form to pass personal estate in Pennsylvania, was declared
invalid. But it was not valid by the law of St. Domingo, and there-
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fore conformed neither to the lex loci acts, nor to the lex domicilii.
In Grattan vs. Appleton, 3 Story, 755, the decedent was domiciled
in the province of New Brunswick, and made certain testamentary
papers at Boston. The law of his domicil was held to control, and
the papers were declared invalid. Returning to the English cases,
we find in -Pricevs. -Dcwhurst,8 Simon, 279, 4 My. & Cr. 76, a
conjoint will made in 1807, by a husband and wife lately removed
from a Danish colony, revoked by posterior wills of both parties
made in England, where they were domiciled. In Prire vs. Prare,
5 Notes of Cases, 595, the will was made in England according to
the English form, by a person domiciled at Malta, and it appearing
that by the law of that island the lex loci acts governed, the will
was admitted. In Moore vs. Budd, 4 Hagg. 346, the decedent
made his will in Spain, where he was domiciled; and it was rejected,
not being conformable to the lex loci act2s, nor to the lex domicilii.
In Thornton vs. Curling, 8 Simon, 810, there was no question as
to the forms of executions-but Lord Cottenham intimated, that the
provisions of the will, which was made in England by a British subject domiciled in France, contravening the civil Code, by providing
for an illegitimate child to the exclusion of a widow and a legitimate
child, might be disregarded by the Court of Chancery.
The precise question then in this case has not been determined.
If it is to be tested by the general doctrine, that the law of the domicil at the time of the death, governs universally,-a principle which
seems to be laid down in many of the cases,-then, although this
point has never been directly passed upon, we still have a rule
applicable to its solution. The English courts have undoubtedly
come to the conclusion that the rule, locus regit actum, does not
govern as to the forms of wills. The case of the Marquis of Hertford settles that point definitely. Whether the law of the domicil
at the time of the death, will ever be applied where the domicil has
been changed since the execution of the will, so as to effect the
revocation of a will valid at the date of its execution, remains
to be seen. There seem to be just reasons why a change of domicil
should not produce such a revocation. The form is not attached to
the person, but to the thing done-it is inherent in the body of the
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act, which when performed with all the solemnities required by the
law of the place where it is done, and by the law of the testator's
domicil at the time, is a consummate and perfect transaction. The
will is then a complete and valid instrument by whatever rule tested.
It has an actual, integral existence. It is a will in due form. Is
it to be changed by a change of abode ?-is its validity to fluctuate
with the migratory habits of the maker, and to depend upon the
contingency of his residence at the time of decease? or originally
performed with all lawful ceremonies, does it stand good once for
all, unless revoked by the express act of the party ? The lex domicilii has been adopted in England, and the lex loci actOs rejected;
and it is supposed this determination is commended by reasons of
simplicity ; but in the nature of things, there does not seem to be
more difficulty or complexity in determining one than the other.
Either rule leads to the adoption of foreign law, and of necessity
to its examination. I do not understand the lex loci act2s to be
carried to the extent of governing the transaction, but simply that
if executed according to that rule it may be good, though defective
according to the lex domicilii. A will executed according to the
law of the domicil at the time of the death, should be held good
under all circumstances. Though defective according to this rule,
if it still be conformable to the lex loci acts, the continental jurists
sustain its validity. If at the time of its execution it be made in
harmony with the solemnities required by the law of the place where
it was made, and where the testator was then domiciled, I can perceive no good reason in the nature of things, why it should be revoted by a simple change of residence of the maker to another
country where other forms are required.
The transaction is a
perfect and valid act, by the common consent of the continental
authorities ; and in the absence of any authoritative decision repugnant to this view, their conclusions as well as reasoning, command
my assent and judgment. It is not without interest as to this subject of revocation, to observe, that our statute seems to contemplate
wills executed with 'other forms than those prescribed by our own
law; and in declaring how wills shall be revoked in writing, uses
such general terms as embrace other forms,-not giving any par-
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ticular mode of revocation, but simply requiring the revocation to
be "executed with the same formalities with which the will itself
was required by law to be executed." Now, Col. Hunt's will was
required by law to be executed in the precise way in which it was
in fact executed-and was then a perfect and legal will. And how
has it been revoked ? By a change of residence ? There is not a
word in all our statute of a revocation effected in that mode ; and
if not, if this will was valid when it was made, and if no will in
writing can be revoked, except in the cases and in the mode required
by our statute, how then has this will been revoked ? But there is
another portion of our law, which appears also to be in harmony
with the liberal usages of those countries where the customs and
doctrines of the civil law prevail. At the revision of our statutes,
a mistake was made in not providing for tbe proof of wills where
the witnesses were out o the jurisdiction of our courts. This was
remedied by the amendatory Act of 1830 (2 R. S. p. 67, §§ 63,
64, 65, 66, 67), and the Chancellor was authorized to issue a commission for the purpose of taking proof in such cases ; but these
provisions apply only to wills executed according to the laws of this
State. Another section provides for proving before the Chancellor
"wills of personal estate, duly executed by persons residing out of
this State, according to laws of the State or country in which the
same were made ;" and then the succeeding section declares, that,
"Cno will of personal estate made out of this State, by a person not
being a citizen of this State, shall be admitted to probate under either
of the preceding provisions; unless such will shall have been executed
according to the laws of the State or country in which the same was
made." (§§ 68, 69. In the matter of Boberts' Will, 8 Paige, 446.)
These provisions appear to adopt the lex loci act-s, in the case of
persons domiciled abroad: although as I have indicated elsewhere,
they do not exclude the operation of the law of the domicil, except
in the particular modes of probate recognized in these sections of
the statute. (Isham vs. Gibbons, 1 Bradford, 77.) I tiink the
fair construction of these provisions makes these sections applicable
to persons residing abroad at the time of the execution of the will;
and in such case recognizes the law of the place where the act was
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performed, as a proper criterion and guide in respect to the formality of the act-not as the only criterion, but as one which the
law is willing to adopt in view of the special modes of probate prescribed in the statute. If that interpretation be reasonable and
just, the policy of our law is sufficiently declarel in this branch of
the statute. In view then of the state of the continental law and
of the jus gentium; in view of our own statute, as well in regard to
revocations as to the recognition of "the lex loci acts, just stated ;
in view of the fact that the will in question was made conformably
to the law of the place where the decedent was domiciled at the
date of its execution ; and in the absence of any authoritative
ruling on the precise point involved, I conclude in favor of the
validity of this instrument as a will of personal estate, and must
direct sentence of probate accordingly.

1a the Court of Chiancery of -ew Jrsey-February,1855.
JOIN R. PAUL

Vs.

ABEL YOUNG.

1. Where A and B exchanged farms, A agreeing to pay B one thousand dollars, in
addition to the farm which was to be conveyed to him, and the wife of A refuses
to unite with her husband in the conveyance, which refusal is by the contrivance
of A, the court will not deprive B of the benefit of a specific performance of
the contract, and will refer the matter to a master to settle the conveyance, so as
to afford B complete indemnity.
2. Where a complainant, on the faith of an agreement with the defendant, has put
himself in a situation from which he cannot extricate himself, this circumstance
will induce a court of equity to give him relief.
3. Where a court of equity will decree a specific performance.

The bill alleges that the defendant is the owner of a farm supposed to contain one hundred and seven acres, situated in the township of l)xford, in the county of Warren, in the State of New Jersey; that on or about the 14th of December, 1854, the complainant
applied to him to purchase his farrh ; and that after some negotiation it was agreed between them, that if the complainant would
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purchase of J. Elias Butz his farm of about the same number of
acres, the defendant would exchange his farm for the Butz farm
and a thousand dollars difference; that at the request of the complainant, the defendant went to consult his wife and family, and,
on returning, said they would all assent to the arrangement; that
the complainant then went and purchased the Butz farm; and being
obliged to leave immediately for his home in Philadelphia, he
authorized his brother, as agent for him, to enter into a written
agreement with the defendant for the exchange of farms; that his
brother as his agent and the saiddefendant, on the same day, executed an agreement in writing, by which it was agreed that on
the first day of April, the said complainant should convey, free
and clear of all incumbrance, the Butz farm to the defendant, and
that on the same day the said defendant should convey to the
complainant the said farm, then owned and occupied by the said
defendant; and further, that the said difference in exchange should
be $1,000, which the said .complainant agreed to pay to the defendant; the bill alleges that the wife of the defendant expressed herself satisfied with the agreement; that on the first of April the
complainant was ready on his part to fulfill the agreement, and tendered to the defendant a deed for the Butz farm, signed by himself
and wife with full covenants; and that on the same day the defendant tendered to the complainant a deed for his farm, but that the
deed was not signed by the wife; that the defendant pretended
his wife could not execute the deed ; that the complainant then
offered to take the deed without the wife's joining in the conveyance, provided the defendant would indemnify him on the Butz
farm against any claim of dower which the wife" of the defendant
might be entitled to hereafter, or by giving him other satisfactory
security.
The bill prays that the said defendant may be decreed specifically to perform the said agreement, by a proper conveyance with
his wife, or that he be decreed to make compensation for the value
of the wife's incumbrance, to be deducted from the purchase
money; or, if more agreeable to equity, that the covenants of the
defendant for incumbrances be declared a lien on the Butz farm, as
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an indemnity against any right or claim of dower which may
hereafter be made by the defendant's wife.
The defendant answered the bill, and depositions were taken by
both parties.
The defence set up will appear fully by the opinion of the Chancellor.
P. Kennedy and W. L. Dayton, for complainant.
J. I. Norton and J. S. Neville, for defendant.
CI.-There are several grounds upon which the
defendant resists a decree for specific performance. I shall notice
them in the order in which they were presented on the argument.
1. It is objected that the wife is not a party to the bill, and that
no decree can be made against her to execute the deed, as she is not
a party to the suit. No decree could be made against her if she
were a party. If she had actually signed the agreement with her
husband, it would have been absolutely void as to her, and no suit
at law or equity, could be maintained against her upon such an
agreement. Afeme covert cannot make any contract, either with
or without the consent of her husband, except as to her separate
estate, in respect either to real or personal property. Our late
statutes respecting the rights of married women, do not affect this
principle of the common law. Had she been made a defendant, a
demurrer as to her would have been sustained. (IWorden et al. vs.
Morris and Wife, 2 G. C. R. 66; 2 Kent. 141; 12 Mad. Ch.
261 ; 6 Wend. 13; 2 Jac. &Walk. 412.) The necessary and proper
parties are therefore before the court.
2. That the defendant, on the day specified in the agreement, was
ready to perform it, and tendered to the complainant a deed for his
farm, which the complainant refused to accept. The defendant
was bound to give to the complainant a deed for the farm free and
clear of all incumbrance. The complainant was entitled to a deed
executed by the defendant and his wife. A deed executed by the
defendant alone, was not a compliance with the agreement. The
complainant was not bound to take such a deed. This was the deed
which was tendered to him. But it was argued that the defendant
WILLIAMSON,
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run no risk by taking such a deed ; that this being a mere exchange
of properties, a court of equity would not, under the circumstances,
ever have permitted the wife to claim her dower in both properties.
iBut why not ? The court could not, upon any principle of equity,
prevent her taking her dower in the land conveyed by her husband
to the complainant. It is that very right which she is now maintaining, and which it is contended this court has no right to impair,
by a decree against her in this case. Suppose she claimed her
dower, too, in the land conveyed by this complainant to her husband. That would be a question between her and the heirs at law
of her husband, in which this complainant could have no possible
interest; and it is difficult to conceive how any legal or equitable
resistance could be made to such a claim, by reason of anything connected with this transaction. It was further said, that the deed was
a substantial compliance with the agreement, because it contained a
covenant to indemnify the complainant against any future claim the
wife might make, and it is shown that the defendant is a man of
property, and his personal covenant a sufficient indemnity. This is
no answer to the objection to such a deed. The complainant offers
to take a sufficient indemnity, but no court would say that the mere
personal covenant was sufficient indemnity against such an incumbrance.
3. A want of mutuality in the contract is urged as an objection
against a decree. It is said, the agent who signed the contract for
the complainant, was not legally authorized, and so the defendant
only was bound by it; and as the defendant could not, for that
reason, compel a specific performance by the complainant, the
parties were not mutually bound, and that in such case a court of
equity will not decree a specific performance. There is some conflict of authority upon this point. It was considered by the court
in the case of Lanning vs. Cole (3 G. C. R. 229), and some of the
authorities are there referred to by the Chancellor. It is evident
his leaning was against the objection. lHe did not decide the point,
however, as the case turned upon other considerations. Most of
the authorities on the point are referred to and reviewed by the
Master of the Rolls in Morris vs. Mitchell, 2 Jac. & Walk. 425.
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The opinion of the Master of the Rolls in that case, is unsatisfactory.
It is not referred to by Chancellor Kent in Benedict vs. Lynch,
1 J. C. R. 373, although much later than any of the authorities
referred to by him. The contract is undoubtedly binding on the
defendant at law ; and if the court refuses to compel a specific perforinance, it is simply on. the ground that the want of mutuality
renders it more equitable that the party should be left to his legal
remedy.
It is no legal, unyielding obstacle to the court's making a decree,
that the contract is signed only by one of the parties. In that
sound, legal discretion, by which a court of equity exercises this
branch of its jurisdiction, it frequently does refuse to decree a specific performance of a contract which is not mutually binding on
both parties ; not, however, because it is a settled principle that the
court will not enforce such a contract, but because that want of
mutuality often constitutes an equitable ground for such refusal.
As if the party not signing the agreement, and therefore not legally
bound, takes advantage of his position, and delays its fulfillment,
till it is ascertained whether the bargain is advantageous to him
now, though the performance of the contract, if he had been bound,
could not have been resisted by reason of the delay, yet the court will
now consider it good ground enough by reason of the want of mutuality in the contract. But even admitting, that as a general rule
the objection is a good one, there are circumstances in this case
which would make it inequitable and oppressive on the complainant
for the court to enforce it. It is proved, and indeed admitted by
the answer, that the complainant purchased the Butz farm, for the
sole purpose of carrying out this contract, and that he was encouraged and urged by the defendant, to make the purchase. ie has
made a large expenditure there, relying upon the good faith of the
defendant. To turn him over to the law under these circumstances,
would not only give him an inadequate remedy, but be permitting
the defendant to practice a fraud upon him. The naked question
is not therefore presented in this case, whether a want of mutuality
is a valid objection against the court's decreeing a specific performance. The conduct of the defendant has been such as to deprive
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him of the benefit of the principle, if, as a general one, it is recognized in equity. The complainant brings himself within the language of Lord Redesdale, in Lawrenson vs. Butler, 1 Schoales &
Lefroy, 19, a case always cited to sustain the objection under
consideration. The complainant on the faith of this agreement, has
put himself into a situation from which he 6ould not extricate himself. That circumstance is sufficient to induce a court of equity
to give relief.
4. The principal ground upon which a decree is resisted, is, that
when the agreement was entered into, the defendant supposed that
his wife would execute the deed, but since she has resisted all his
reasonable persuasions, and now refuses, it is rendered impossible
for him to perform his contract; the court ought not, under such
circumstances, to make a decree against him to do that which is out
of his power to do.
In examining the evidence of the case, it is impossible to resist
the conclusion that the defendant has acted in bad faith in this
transaction, and that the unwillingness and refusal ot the wife to
execute the deed is more in compliance with the wishes of her husband than her own disposition and unrestrained judgment. There
is enough evidence to show that the complainant was unwilling to
enter into the contract until the wife of the defendant was first consulted, and gave her assent ; and that, notwithstanding the denial
in the answer, she did assent to the contract. She gave her reasons
why she considered the bargain an advantageous one to herself and
husband. It is proved that the defendant declared his determination to back out, as he expressed it. His position is not one to ask
any favor of the court, or to give him the benefit of a doubtful principle to which fair and upright dealing might justly lay a claim.
But the fact is, the wife now refuses to execute the deed; and it
is necessary to its validity that she should sign it, and acknowledge,
before the proper officer, that she signed, sealed and delivered it as,
her voluntary act and deed, freely, without any fear, threats or
compulsion of her husband. If the court decrees a specific performance according to the terms of the contract, the husband must
procure his wife to sign the deed in some way, per fas aut nefas,
27
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or else take the consequences of disobedience to the order of the
court. This then is, in effect, a decree by which the wife is forced
into executing a deed. When she is brought before the proper
officer, he certifies to her acknowledgment of its being her free and
voluntary act, when it is notorious that it is the decree of this
court, held up to her in terrorem, which must be either obeyed by
her husband through her submission, or he be subjected to punishment for disobedience. Such a decree is against the policy of the
law protecting the rights of a wife in the lands of her husband. It
is plain to be seen, that this mode of alienation might be adopted
by an improvident and oppressive man, to strip a prudent wife of
all the reliance for her future support. Her refusal to sign a deed,
would be easily overcome, by her husband entering into a contract
that she shall join him in a conveyance ; and then a decree of this
court is looked to as the instrument of her oppression. She may
have firmness enough to resist his unreasonable demand and entreaties, but yield to the persuasion of a decree of this court, which
threatens her continued refusal with the incarceration of her husband. Upon an examination of the authorities, it will be found
that the doctrine is not as firmly established as a cursory view of
them might lead us to suppose.
Judge Story (Story Eq. 732) pointedly and emphatically condemns the doctrine-that a court of equity will decree the specific performance of an agreement, by which the husband covenants
that his wife shall execute a conveyance to bar her of her estate,
when performance is resisted on the ground of the wife's refusal to
join in the deed. The authorities are referred to, but the author
does not give his opinion, whether they are such as should lead to
the conclusion, that the doctrine should be considered as settled by
authority either way.
The case of Hall vs. Hardy, (3 P. Wins. 186,) was a bill for the
specific performance of an award by which the plaintiff was to pay
X10 to the defendant on such a day, and £30 at another day; and
that thereupon the defendant should procure his wife to join with
him in conveying the premises to the plaintiff and his heirs. The
answer did not Get up the refusal of the wife. The Master of the
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Rolls says, "there have been a hundred precedents, where, if the
husband for a valuable consideration covenants that the -wife shall
join with him in a fine, the court has decreed the husband to do it,
for that he has undertaken it, and must lie by it, if he does not
perform it." And yet the note to this very remark of the Master
of the Rolls, (note B, page 188,) leaves it quite uncertain as to
the extent these hundred precedents carried the doctrine. "Because in all these cases, it is to be presumed, that the husband,
where he covenants that his wife shall levy a fine, has first gained
her consent for that purpose. So said by the Master of the Rolls,
in the case of Winter vs. Devereux, Trinity, 1723; and that the
interest in such covenants has been taken to be an inheritance
descending to the heir of the covenantee. But, after all, if it can
be made apear to have been impossible for the husband to procure
the concurrence of his wife (as suppose there are differences between

them,) surely the court would not decrbe an impossibility, especially where the husband offers to return all the money, with interest and costs, and to answer all the damages." (Note B, referred
to.) But here is the very point we want precedent for-the
court's making a decree for the defendant to do an impossibilityto control the will of his wife and compel her voluntarilyto execute

a deed; for the deed is worthless except done of her free will.
There is no difficulty, where the defendant does not set up the
refusal of his wife as a defence. But where the refusal is set up as
a defence, and it appears by the evidence that such refusal is the
reason why the defendant does not perform his covenant, for this
court to make a decree which compels the wife to execute a deed,
and then to accept it as a free will offering, is carrying the jurisdiction of the court very far.
The case of Barry vs. Wade, Rep. Temp. Finch, 180, I have
not seen; but the book is admitted not to be very reliable authority.
In Barrington vs. Stone (2 Eq. Abridg. 17, pl. 8), the decree was,
that the husband should procure his wife to join with him in a fine
to the plaintiff, according to his covenant. The answer set up that
the wife did not seal the deed, but not her refusal to join with her
husband in a fine.
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In Otread vs. Bound (4 Vin. Ab. 202, pl. 4), Lord Cowper
refused to decree a specific performance of such a covenant, the
husband offering to refund the purchase money with bosts. The
case as cited in Viner is as follows: "Husband and wife did, upon
a valuable consideration, by lease and release, convey the wife's
land in fee, and covenanted that the wife should levy a fine of the
same to the use of the purchaser. The wife refused to levy a fine.
Thee plaintiff brought his bill to have his title perfected by a specific
performance of the covenant, and a precedent was cited where a
specific performance had been decreed in the like case; but the
Chancellor would not decree a specific performance in this case,
because upon such decree the husband could not compel his wife to
levy a fine; and if she would not comply, imprisonment would fall
upon the husband for contempt, which was the ill consequence of
the decree in the said cited case."
In -Emery vs. Ware (8 Yes. 505), -Lord Eldon refuses his assent
to the doctrine carried to the extent of the court's making the
decree in the face of the refusal of the wife; and in Martin vs.
Mitchel (2 Jac. & Walk. 418), Sir Thomas Plumer, Master of the
Rolls, decides these points: that a husband and wife having a joint
power of appointment by deed over the wife's estate, agree in
writing to sell it, a .decree for specific performance cannot be compelled against them; and under a contract by husband and wife,
for sale of the wife's estate,, the court will not decree him to procure her to join. He remarks: "The point that the court should
compel the husband to'coerce the wife to join with him in the conveyance, was abandoned. The counsel did not urge that that is
the law now, and that the husband was to go to prison, if she
refuses to concur."
Upon a careful examination of all the authorities, if the alternative were presented to me of making a decree for specific performance by procuring the wife to join in the deed, or to dismiss
this bill, I should accept the latter.
I am, however, relieved in this case, from denying the complainant relief on account of any such embarrassment. The complainant offers by his bill, in case of the refusal of the defendant's.
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wife to join in the deed, to take indemnity. The power of the
court to direct indemnity is denied. The case eminently calls for
"ts exercise, and I do not think it can be denied upon authority or
principle.
In the case of Milligan vs. Choke (16 Yes. 1), for the plaintiff
it was stated that he desired not a reduction of the purchase money,
but an indemnity against the risk, which must not be a personal
idemnity, but upon real estate, or by part of the purchase money to
be kept in court; the defendant taking the dividends. Lord Eldon
said, the purchaser was entitled to that; that the proper compensation was indemnity, by which the loss, if it should happen, would
be made good; and if it did not happen, there was no occasion-for
compensation. A reference was made to a master to settle such
security by way of indemnity, as, under all the circumstances of
the title, it should appear just and reasonable that the defendant
should execute. Upon an intimation of the Lord Chancellor the
case was re-argued, and the decree was affirmed. I cannot find
that, by any subsequent case, the propriety of this decision of
Lord Eldon has been questioned.
In Balmanno vs. Lumley, (1 V. & B. 224,) Lord Eldon confined
the order to compensation, and is reported to have said he did not
apprehend the court could compel the purchaser to take an indemnity, or the vendor to give it. He certainly did not mean to question the correctness of the principle upon which he had made the
decree in Milligan vs. Cooke. The manner in which both those
cases are referred to, in a note to Patton vs. Brebner and another
(1 Bligh, 67), shows that they were not considered in conflict, or
that the latter overruled the former; but that, while it is a general
rule that courts of equity will not compel a vendor to give an
indemnity, there is no inflexible rule or principle to prevent the
court's doing it, when a proper case presents itself. If there is
anything in the reasoning that a court of equity cannot, upon principle, decree an indemnity because the parties have not contracted
for it, it would equally apply against the jurisdiction of the court
to award compensation for any deficierfcy in the title, quantity,
quality, description, or other matters touching the estate. In
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Graham vs. Oliver, (3 Beav. 124,) Lord Langdale says: "There is,
however, a very great difficulty in all these cases, and I scarcely
know how it can be overcome; though a partial performance only,
it has been somewhat incorrectly called a specific performance.
The sentiments of Lord Redesdale, on this point, as expressed by
him in two cases before him, are strongly impressed on my mind.
The court has thought it right, in many cases, to get over these
difficulties for the purpose of compelling parties to perform the
agreements into which they have entered; and it is right they
should be compelled to do so, where it can be done without any
great preponderance of inconvenience."
In the case before the court, if it is beyond the reach of its
jurisdiction to decree indemnity, then it has not the power to do
what is manifestly equitable and just between the parties to this
contract; and the complainant must submit to a fraud, without any
adequate means of redress. Indemnity can be ordered in this case,
not only "without any great preponderance of inconvenience," but
without any inconvenience at all. As the case is presented, it is
the very remedy which suggests itself, as the proper and natural
mode of administering equity between the parties, and is free from
every objection as to hardship or inconvenience. The defendant
need not be called upon to give collateralindemnity, but it may be
obtained in settling the mutual conveyances to be made between
the parties.
By the terms of the agreement, the complainant is to convey to
the defendant the Butz farm, and pay him one thousand dollars,
as the consideration for the premises which the defendant has
agreed to convey to the complainant, The wife of the defendant
refuses to unite with her husband in the conveyance; and this
refusal is owing entirely to the contrivance and fraud of the
defendant, who, in this way, is endeavoring to deprive the complainant of the benefit of a specific performance of the contract.
The court should order this agreement performed; and the conveyances to be so made between the parties, that the complainant
may hold, in the land which he conveys, an indemnity against any
future claim to be set up by the defendant's wife.
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I shall decree a specific performance, and a reference to a
master, with directions to settle the conveyances; and if the wife
of the defendant refuses to join her husband in a deed, then to
direct the conveyances in such manner as will afford the complainant a complete indemnity in the premises.

In the District Court of PhiladelpTia--April,1855.
DAVIS VS. OBERTEUFFER.
1. General release discharges land from a condition not to build in a particular
mann
nei.
2. Pleading over admits that the release operated as averred.

Trespass quare clausum fregit. Pleas-, not guilty and issue;
2, that one Samuel W. Fisher was the owner of a large lot on Chestnut street, including the locus in quo. That by indenture, in 1813,
(profert) he conveyed the locus in quo to one Israel Maule, subject to
the following conditions, to wit: "That no building should be erected
on a certain part of the lot beyond a height of ten feet, and if any
building should be erected contrary to the intent of the condition
that it should be lawful for said Fisher, his heirs and assigns, and
the owners and occupiers of any part of the land lying, &c., to enter
and abate." That there was erected a building contrary to the
intent and in violation of the condition, and that defendant is owner
under Fisher, and occupier of part of the land lying, &c., and as
such owner and occupier, he entered and abated, which is the trespass
complained of.
Plea 3d was like the first, with the additional averments, that
Fisher conveyed to Maule upon the conditions mentioned in the 2d
plea, and also subject to a yearly rent charge of $300, that Maule
conveyed to lBrugiere, in 1814, subject to the conditions and rent
charge. That by an indenture of 1820, (profert) Brugiere cbnveyed to Klosser, subject to the aforesaid conditions, under whom
plaintiff claims.
Replication to 2d and 3d pleas to 1st count.-That after the
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conveyance by the said Samuel W. Fisher to the said Israel Maule,
of the premises in the declaration mentioned, the estate of him, the
said Israel Maule, became, and was by lawful conveyances, vested
in one Charles Brugiere, who thereby then and there was seised in
his demesne, as of fee, of, in and to the same, subject to the said
conditions in the said pleas mentioned. And that, whilst the said
Charles Brugiere was so seised thereof, and whilst the said Samuel
W. Fisher continued to be seised and possesed of the residue of his
lot, as of the same estate he had therein at the time of the convey-,
ance aforesaid by him to the said Israel Maule, he, the said
Samuel W. Fisher,- by indenture, dated the 31st day of August,
1814, sealed with his seal, (profert) did grant, bargain, sell, assign,
release and extinguish unto him, the said Charles Brugiere, his heirs
and assigns, all the estate, right, title and interest of him, the said
Samuel W. Fisher, in the said premises so as aforesaid conveyed by
him to the said Israel Maule, and by the said Israel Maule to the
said Charles Brugiere, and this he is ready to verrify, &c.
Rejoinder.-That by the deed of the 31st day of August, 1814,
of Samuel W. Fisher to Charles Brugiere, the conditions set out in
the said plea were not extinguished or discharged. And of this the
said defendant puts himself on the country.
Demurrer :-causes-that the said rejoinder does not traverse any
material averment or matter of fact put in issue by the replication,
but traverses a supposed conclusion or inference of law from the
facts set forth in the replication. 2. That the rejoinder seeks to
put in issue matter of law, viz. the effect of a certain indenture or deed mentioned in the replication. 3d. That it is irregular,
unusual and improper, and presents no issue of fact on which the
plaintiff can go to trial; that if it was intended to question the
effect of the conveyance set up in the replication, the regular and
proper course would have been to crave oyer and demur, when the
court could have decided the question, which apparently it is
desired to raise; whereas by the course adopted, the court cannot
inspect or examine the deed in the replication mentioned, nor can
they see whether or not the legal effect is truly set out, or whether
the conditions were thereby released. 4th. That the rejoinder is
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an informal, irregular and improper demurrer, so far as it is of any
account and substance, while in form it tends to mislead, and to an
immaterial issue, and one which the party cannot try, and an issue
which the plaintiff cannot join in with safety. 5th. Because the
issue presented is uncertain whether it is intended to traverse the
consequences of the conveyance in the replication mentioned, or the
legal effect thereof, or the contents of the same.
.MeMurtrieand John M. Bead, for the plaintiff. The rejoinder
is clearly bad, as the effect of the release is a question of law, and
that it is pleaded according to its legal effect, is admitted by pleading over. If it was intended to deny this, the deed should have
been set forth on oyer, or the execution traversed, and objection
taken for the variance. Pollitt vs. _Forrest, 11 Q. B. 949; Webb
vs. Spicer, 13 Q. B. 885; Moore vs. Plymouth, 3 B. & Ald. 66;
Portmore vs. Bunn, 1 B. & C. 694; Bird vs. Smith, 12 Q. B.
794; .Ranington vs. Cannon, 12 C. B. 18. The plea is bad as
setting up by a stranger a right to enter for condition broken. Co.
Litt. 203 b, 214 a, 215 a, 201, a & n 1; §§ 720, 723 ; 2 Prest.
Convey. 201; Com. Dig. Cond. 0 1; 3 Atk. 139; 3 Sug. V. & P.
467. No case has gone further than to say that the grantee of the
reversion may take advantage of a condition, and there is no averment of such a grant here. Nor can there be an inference that
any other estate than a condition was reserved, for it is so pleaded,
and as such it was capable of operating. It is clear that the right
in Fisher was capable of release, or the present defendant can have
no interest, and it being admitted by the pleadings that all his
estate in the premises passed to Brugiere, no one claiming under
him subsequently can have any interest.
JDropsie contra. The plaintiff does not connect himself with
.Brugiere, to whom the release was made.
April 19, 1856.-The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARE, J.-This is an action of trespass quare clausum fregit.
The declaration contains two counts. The defendant pleaded not
guilty, on which issue was joined, and the plaintiff had a verdict;
and also two pleas, which aver that the lot on which the alleged
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trespass was committed, was originally granted by Fisher, to one
Maule, subject to a condition, that the grantee should not build beyond a certain height, and that if he did, the grantor might enter
and abate so much of the structure thus erected, as violated the condition. These pleas were pleaded to both counts; and were met
under the first, by a replication that after the execution of the
original conveyance, the land conveyed was assigned to one Brngiere, under whom the plaintiff claimed, and that while he held it
under this assignment, "Fisher granted, bargained and sold, assigned, released, and extinguished, all the estate, right, title, and interest
of him the said Fisher, in the said premhises, to the said Brugiere."
We think it unnecessary to notice the numerous and difficult questions
which have been raised in this case, because we are clearly of the opinion that the release thus set forth in the replication, is an extinguishment of the condition, and consequently bars the justification which
is based upon it. It is indeed said, that the words of release were
not meant to have the sweeping effect which the replication attributes
to them, and were intended to operate solely on a ground rent, which
was reserved at the same time with the condition. This may well
be so, and it may also be, that if the deed of release had been set
forth in the replication, or if the defendant had craved oyer, and
thus made it a part of the record, we should have held that the
generality of its language, was qualified and restrained by its premises, and went no further than an extinguishment of the rent,
without touching the condition. But as the matter now stands, we
have no choice but to determine that words of release, as comprehensive as words can be made, must be construed in accordance with
their literal meaning.; and consequently, preclude the defendant
from claiming anything in or out of the land, which his predecessor
had thus completely exonerated and acquitted.
The replication to the pleas to the second count, we think insufficient ; but do not deem it necessary to give our reasons, because our
decision on those to the first count, is decisive of the right of the
plaintiff to judgment on the verdict.
Judgment is accordingly entered for the plaintiff, on the first
count, and for the defendant on the second and third pleas to the
second count.

POWERS vs. MORTEE.

In the United States Circuit Court for the .Eastern .District of
Louisiana.
CHARLES POWERS,

GUARDIAN vs. ANDINE OLIVIA MORTEE, AND THOTIAS
J. MIORTEE HER HUSBAND.

1. Where a resident in Louisiana died intestate, leaving two minor children surviving him, who had been placed, in the father's lifetime, in the care of an uncle in
the State of New York, and he having, after the father's death, been duly appointed
their guardian there, an application made in Louisiana by the uncle to set aside
proceedings in that State appointing the grandmother tutrix will be refused;

neither will the court decree a sum of money to be paid to the New York guardian
for the support and education of the children.
2. Authority conferred on a guardian in New York can give him no right to come
into Louisiana, and take the minor's property there, which is already in the pos-

session of a legal tutrix.
3. The rights and duties of guardians are strictly local.
4. The domicil of the minor must follow the domicil of the father.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-The late James Brown jr., who was for many
years a citizen of this State, and a resident of the Parish of St.
Tammany, departed this life on the 16th of September, 1853. He
died intestate, leaving two children, viz : Adelaide Clare, aged ten
years, and Emma Eliza, aged eight years, who were the only children
born of his marriage with his first wife, Eliza Hosmer. He
also left as widow in community Rosa Ginault, his second wife, who
was pregnant at the time of his death, and who has since been
delivered of a female child named, Louisa Laura. The first wife of
Brown died several years before her husband. After her death, her
surviving children were committed by their father to the care of
their grandmother, Mrs. Mortee, one of the defendants in this action.
They remained under her charge for seven or eight years, and were
then taken to New York, and placed by their father under the care
of the plaintiff, Charles Powers and his wife (the latter being the sister
of the said James Brown), where they now remain. Since the death
of the father, their grandmother, Mrs. Mortee, has demanded the
possession of the children; but the plaintiff refuses to comply with
the demand, upon the ground that it was the wish and request of
their father that they should remain under the care and protection
M CALEIB,
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of himself and wife. He alleges "that after the decease of the
father, at the request of the grandfather and uncle and aunt of the
said children, be applied to the Surrogate's Court, in the State of
New York, and was legally appointed the guardian of the said children, who now reside with him and his wife in that State, and are
supported and educated out of their own funds. The relatives at
whose request this proceeding was resorted to, are the paternal
grandfather, uncle and aunt of the children. The letters of guardianship were granted by the Surrogate of Richmond county, in the
State of New York, on the 16th of January, 1854.
Immediately after the death of James Brown, jr., his succession
was opened in the Parish of St. Tammany, and an administrator
appointed. The defendant, Mrs. Mortee, being the grandniother of
the minor children, and the only ascendant residing in the State of
Louisiana, was by law entitled to the tutorship, and was, by an order of
the Eighth District Court, appointed tutrix on the 29th of November,
1853. Her husband, by the same authority, was appointed co-tutor.
They both aver that they have complied with all the requisites of
the law, and have given bond and security to the satisfaction of a
meeting of the friends of the family of the minors, in a sum sufficient
to cover their interest in their father's estate as well as the property
they inherited from their mother. They further aver, that they
have thus been legally appointed to the tutorship of the said minors,
and are now in the discharge of their duty in that capacity. They
deny that the plaintiff Powers has any right to control or interfere
with the persons or property of the said minors in any manner.
The avowed object of this action, as appears from the plaintiff's
petition, is to set aside the proceedings of the Eighth District Court,
appointing the defendants tutrix and co-tutor of the minors, as
illegal, null and void, and to recover possession of the property
belonging to the succession of James Brown, jr. or as much thereof
as legally belongs to these two children. In the event of a refusal
on the part of this court to grant to the plaintiff the possession of
the property, he prays that the court will award a sum of money to
be paid to him, from time to time, for the support and education of
the children.
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We have seen that the father died intestate ; that although he
placed the children under the care of his brother-in-law and sister
in New York, there is nothing to show that he ever intended to
remove to that State, and fix his permanent residence there; nor
does it appear that it was his wish that the children should reside
there for any other purpose than to obtain an education. The correspondence introduced in evidence, certainly exhibits great solicitude on his part, that his children should continue to remain under
the care of his sister. But as this solicitude was only expressed in
reference to their education, and evidently did not relate to their
permanent residence, either during his own life, or in the event of
his death, it is impossible to say that any change of domicil was
ever contemplated. It is clear, in point of fact, that the domicil of
the father was in Louisiana; and it is equally clear, in point of
law, that the appointhient of a tutor or curator to a minor, belongs
to the judge of probates of the place of domicil, or usual residence
of the father and mother of such minor, if they or either of them
be living. If the father and mother be dead, the appointment shall
be made by the judge of probates, at their last place of domicil;
or, if they had no domicil, of the minor's nearest relations. The
place of birth of a person is considered as his domicil, if it is at the
time of his birth the domicil of- his parents, patris originem unusquisque sequitur. The domicil of birth of minors continues until
they have obtained a new domicil. Minors are generally deemed
incapable of changing their domicil during their minority, and
therefore they retain the domicil of their parents; and if the
parents. change their domicil, that of the children follows it; and
if the father dies, his last domicil is that of the infant children.
(Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 1, 1. 3, 4, Story's Conflict of Laws, 44.) It is
wholly inconsistent with our law, that any one not resident in the
State should be appointed a tutor to a minor whose domicil is
within the State, and whose interests or property may be here
situated, (C. C. 351, 5 N. S. 382;) and it is quite unnecessary,
therefore, to discuss the claims of the plaintiff, or of any other
relative or connexion of these minors residing in New York, to be
appointed their tutor; nor is it necessary, for the purposes of a
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correct decision of this case, to inquire into the legality of the
appointment of the plaintiff as guardian, by the Surrogate of Richmond county, New York. The question for this court simply is,
can the authority thus conferred upon the plaintiff, as guardian of
these minors in the State of New York, give him a right to come
into this State, and take the property already in the possession of
a tutrix appointed at the place where that property is situated, and
administer it for the benefit of those minors? It is clear to my
mind that he has no such right. He could not by the laws of
Louisiana claim the tutorship of these minors at all, and for the
simple reason that he does not reside within the State where the
minors have their legal domicil, and where their property is situated;
and even if he were a resident of the State, his claims would not,
under our law, be preferred to those of their grandmother. I am
called upon to decide a question involving the right to the possession of property, according to the law of Louisiana, and not
according to that of New York. Whatever may be the rights the
appointment of guardian would confer in the latter State, it is
clear that it confers no extra-territorial authority to perform acts
directly opposed to the whole policy of our own laws; for who can
doubt that it would be at war with the express provisions of our
code, to permit a guardian residing in the State of New York to
assume the administration of minors' property in Louisiana; our
own legislature has prescribed rules and regulations upon this
subject. It has thought proper to say how and by whom such
property shall be administered; and it is sufficient to say that
the plaintiff has not shown that he is within the requirements of
the law.
It is well established in our jurisprudence, that when the father
and mother of the minor are dead, the grandfather is entitled of
right and by law, to the tutorship of the minor; and no supposed
aversion of the minor towards him, can deprive him of it, that it
may be given to a brother of the deceased. It is equally well
established that when no tutor has been appointed by will, it is the
duty of the judge of the court of probates, to give the tutorship to
the nearest ascendant of the minor. 10 La. 541-2. In such a
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case, where both parents are dead, the grandfather is entitled to
letters of tutorship ; and it is unnecessary to call a family meeting
to authorize or sanction his appointment. Ibid. C. C. 281. In the
case now before the court, it is unnecessary to consider the claims of
the grandfather, inasmuch as it is not shown that either paternal or
maternal grandfather has asserted any claims to the tutorship. The
latter is dead, and the former is a resident of the State of New
York, and could not for the reasons already adduced, from Louisiana
law, receive the appointment of tutor even if he had demanded it.
Under such circumstances, the grandmother, being the nearest
ascendant in the direct line of the minor, residing within the State,
and where the property is situated, had a clear right to claim the
tutorship by the effect of the law. C. 0. 281, 284.
It is impossible to perceive upon what solid ground the claims of
the plaintiff in this case can rest.
Th& rights and powers of
guardians are considered as strictly local, and not as entitling them
to exercise any authority over the person or personal property of
their wards in other States, upon the same general reasoning and
policy which have circumscribed the rights and authorities of
executors and administrators. (Morrill vs. Dickey, 1 Johns. Chan.
153; Story's Conflict of Laws, § 499.) To authorize the plaintiff
to take charge of the property of these minors, whether to administer it within this State, or to sell it and remove it beyond the
reach of the lex rei sitwo, some higher powers than those which are
necessarily incidental to his appointment of guardian, under the
laws of New York, should be exhibited. If the legal domicil of
these minors was in New York, there would perhaps be some
ground for the claims he has asserted before the court; but we
have seen that there has been no change of domicil since the death
of the father, for the reason that it is not in the power of the children, during their minority, to make such a change. We have also
seen that the person designated by our laws as entitled to the tutorship, has actually been appointed; and our code expressly declares
that the domicil of a minor not emancipated, is that of his father,
mother, or tutor.
But the plaintiff contends that no tutrix has been legally ap-
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pointed; thit the powers exercised by the clerk, as they appear
from the mortuary proceedings in the court having charge of the
settlement of the succession of James Brown, jr. were illegal and
unconstitutional. Let us admit for a moment that this position
were strictly correct-in what possible mode would the alleged
irregularities operate in favor of the plaintiff? Let us suppose
that Mrs. Mortee were now deprived of her tutorship, would he,
under any circumstances, be entitled to demand of this court an
order to put him in her place? From the view we have already
taken of the law of this case, it is clear that the statement of the
question would necessarily call for a negative reply.
Here I might with propriety leave the case; but my respect for
the argument of the counsel for the plaintiff, has induced me to
examine the Act of the Legislature of Louisiana, approved April
30th, 1853, entitled "An Act to prescribe the powers and duties
of clerks of courts, the Parish of Orleans excepted." The seventysixth article of the Constitution of Louisiana declares that "the
legislature shall have power to vest in clerks of courts authority to
grant such orders and do such acts as may be deemed necessary
for the furtherance of the administration of justice; and in all
cases the powers thus granted shall be specified and determined."
Among the powers specified and determined in the act above referred to, we find the power to administer oaths in all cases; to
grant orders for affixing seals, taking inventories, and making petitions, and to order the execution of wills; to confirm testamentary
executors; to confirm and appoint tutors and under-tutors; to
order family meetings, and homologate their proceedings, if no
o)position is made thereto; to grant ordersfor the sale of succescession property, &c.
The powers here granted by the legislature were sufficiently
ample to authorize the acts of the clerk of the Eighth District
Court, in reference to the appointment of the tutrix; and so far
from the legislature having transcended its constitutional authority,
it seems to have possessed full power over the subject, in virtue of
the constitution itself. The whole policy of the law is apparent.
It is to prevent delays in the settlement of successions; to facili-
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tate the ordinary proceedings for that purpose, in the absence of
the judge, who is compelled to hold court in the different parishes
composing his district, and who cannot, therefore, be present at the
various places where the courts are held, to grant such orders as
are indispensably necessary for the speedy and proper administration of justice. If the clerk should commit errors and irregularities, in the exercise of the powers specifically conferred by
law, the parties aggrieved have their remedy by an opposition,
which would bring the errors complained of before the judge for
revision.
A full consideration of the merits of this case, has led me to the
conclusion that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief he seeks at
the hands of this court, and that his petition must'be dismissed
with costs.
A judgment of dismissal must be entered accordingly.

In the iSuperior Court of Baltimore City.
HENRY RIEAIAN & SONS VS. WILLIAM FISHER.
1. A public note or bill-broker who sells a note, impliedly warrants the genuine-

ness of the signatures and endorsements; and should the bill prove to be forged,
the loss must fall upon the vendor.

2. A public broker must be regarded as the principal in his business transactions,
unless he discloses his agency at the time of the sale.
3. The case of Baxter vs. Duren, 29 Maine, 440, denied.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
LEE, T.-This is an action to recover from the defendant, William
Fishar, a sum of money which the plaintiffs paid for a promissory
note sold to them by the defendant, and they seek to recover it back,
on the ground that the note, when sold, was not genuine, the name
of the drawer and one of the endorsers being forged; and upon the
trial the plaintiffs, to support the issue on their part, produced the
promissory note, purporting to have been made by Edward Dunn,
in favor of JaCob F. Kridler, and" endorsed by said Kridler and
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Henry Shirk, for $861, payable eleven months after date, and
dated Baltimore, February 1, 1854. They further proved, by a
competent witness, that they purchased said note from the defendant Fisher, who was a public bill and note broker in the city of
Baltimore, (and who dealt in having notes discounted or sold,) for
the sum of $651 08; and also proved that the defendant -was
generally known in the city as a public bill and note broker, largely
engaged in the selling of bills, notes and stocks, and that the
plaintiffs had frequently bought the promissory notes of other persons from said defendant, before the purchase by the plaintiffs of
the note in this case.
That the defendant was in the habit of bringing to the countingroom of the plaintiffs a large- number of notes at a time, for the
purpose of selling them to the plaintiffs, before the sale of the note
in question.
And the plaintiffs further proved, by Edward Dunn and Henry
Shirk, that their names, written upon the said note as maker and
endorser, were not in their handwriting, but were forged ; but that
the name of Jacob F. Kridler, written in two places on the back
of said note, was his genuine handwriting; and that Kridler was a
man in good credit in the city of Baltimore down to the 27th of
November, 1854, when he absconded, having committed other
forgeries; and that said Kridler left some property behind him,
upon which there are mechanics' liens.
The defendant, on his part, gave in evidence, by a competent
witness, (his clerk,) that at the time of the sale by the defendant
to the plaintiffs of the note in question, Kridler was in the habit,
before this time, of putting into the hands of Fisher, as a bill and
note broker, for the purpose of sale on account of said Kridler,
various notes held by Kridler, and endorsed by him; but the particular notes were not named or recollected by the witness ; and
also proved that the defendant is a public bill and note broker in
the city for all persons who may employ him for that purpose,
handing over to such persons the proceeds of sale of such notes as
he sells, less the commissions charged for such sales; and that the
proceeds of sale of the note now in question were paid by the
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defendant to his principal who employed him to sell it, before the
alleged forgery of the names of Dunn and Shirk upon the said note
was suspected, either by the plaintiffs or defendant.
Upon these facts the plaintiffs, by their counsel, asked an instruction from the court that they were entitled to recover in this
suit ; and counter instructions were prayed by the defendant.
I am aware that the question is an interesting one, and for the
first time raised in this State, as to the liability of a public note or
bill broker for the genuineness of a note or bill sold by him-he at
the time being ignorant of the fact; in other words, both the plaintiffs and the defendant in this case are shown to have been innocent
parties, and ignorant of the forgeries on the note in question at the
time the sale of it was made. Who shall, in such a case as this,
bear the loss ?
It has been contended at the bar that the defendant, a public
-bill broker, should be regarded as the principal, or that in selling
the note, even as agent, there was, on his part, an implied warranty
to the vendees (the plaintiffs) of the note being what it purported to
be, a valid and genuine note; that the sufficiency or solvency, or
ability of the parties to the note, was the risk which the vendees
encountered, but in the event of the note's being false and forged,
the vendor should bear the loss.
On the other hand, it is insisted by the defendant that, as the
plaintiffs in this case had dealt with him as a broker, and knew the
business which he was engaged in, which was the disposing by sale
of notes on account of other parties, that they should have known
or presumed he was an agent, and acted with him as such in the
sale of notes.
English and American authorities have been cited, which, I
think, apart from a sound rule of public policy, determine the liability of the proper party here; and without referring particularly
to all. the authorities, I will name the last leading case in England,
of Gurney et al. vs. Wirmbsly et al., decided as late as November,
1854, by the Court of Queen's Bench, in which Lord Campbell
decides that the vendor of a bill of exchange, though no party to
the bill, is responsible for its genuineness; and if it turns out that
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the name of one of the parties to it is forged, he is liable to the
vendees.
The defendants in that case were bill brokers, who received the
bill to be discounted, and took it to the plaintiffs, who were money
lenders, with whom the defendants, as bill brokers, had previously
had similar dealings; the defendants did not disclose their principal, and were regarded as principals; and it was held by the
court, all the judges concurring, that they were liable, and the plaintiffs should recover back the amount paid by them for the forged
bill. Lord Campbell, at page 259 of vol. 28 of English Law and
Equity Reports, says: "Here that which Purported to be the
acceptance of one of the parties to the bill, and upon which the
plaintiffs gave credit and relied, was a forgery, and of no value
whatever ; in fact the instrument altogether became of no value,
for Anderson was a bankrupt; there was, therefore, clearly a
failure of consideration, entitling the plaintiffs to recover."
The case at bar is like the case decided by Lord Campbell, and
the same rule should apply, in my opinion, to its determination.
No decision in England, before or since, is in conflict with that
decision ; and I will now refer to one or two American cases, read
at the bar, from which it will be seen that, except the case of
Baxter vs. Duren, in 29 Maine Reports, (chiefly relied on by the
defendant here,) no authority can be found to impair or conflict
with the judgment of Lord Campbell. In the case of the Canal
Bank vs. The Bank of Albany, 1st Hill Sup. Court Reports of New
York, page 290, Judge Cowen, in substance, affirms the doctrine
established by Lord Campbell, and says, "no doubt the parties are
equally innocent in a moral point of view; it was the duty, or more
properly a measure of prudence in each to have inquired into the
genuineness of the note; they (the defendants) have obtained the
plaintiffs' money without consideration, and the plaintiffs have a
right to recover (though, there was ignorance on both sides of any
forgery;) that was a case of forged bank notes passed by the
defendants to the plaintiffs. Other decisions in Massachusetts and
New York sustain the same view. But the case of Baxter vs.
Duren, 29 Maine, p, 440, is invoked to establish a different rule
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from that laid down by Lord Campbell, and confirmed by many
American authorities. (See cases referred to in Story on Bills.)
With entire respect for the court, it will be found, on examining the
authorities upon which it rests its decision in Baxter vs. Duren, at
page 441, that they do not sustain the doctrine of the learned
Judge : viz. "that where no debt is due or created at the-time, and
the paper is sold as other goods and effects are, the purchaser cannot recover from the seller the purchase money. There is in such
case no implied warranty of the genuineness of the paper; the law
respecting the sale of goods is applicable; the only implied warranty is, that the seller owns or is lawfully entitled to dispose of the
paper or goods." If this be the true rule, which I respectfully
submit cannot be sustained by authority or on principles of public
policy, then in no event could a bill broker be liable, either as
principal or agent, if no implied warranty attaches, unless where
the note is paid away for a previous debt or in payment of goods, etc.
A public broker, like the defendant in this case, must be regarded
as the principalin all his business transactions, unless he discloses
his agency at the time.
How is he otherwise an agent, and whose agent is he? To illustrate the force and justice of this doctrine, as sanctioned by the
Court of Queen's Bench, and by Justice Story, suppose a bill broker
sells a coupon bond, for instance, which is transferred by delivery
only without an endorsement or formal transfer, and it turns out to
be a forgery, can it be maintained that he is not responsible for the
genuineness of the bonds; and can the fact of his being known to
be a general agent relieve him, if at the time of the sale he did not
disclose the principal or party for whom he was agent in this particular transaction ? The answer is conclusive and his liability certain. To relieve himself, therefore, in a case like this, from responsibility, he should have disclosed his principal. This can be the only
safe rule, which, it will be found, is sanctioned by Judge Story in
his learned work on Promissory Notes and Agency. A contrary
doctrine carried to the extent of the case in Baxter vs. Duren, in
29 Maine Reports, would open the door to fraud, gross injustice and
commercial incbnvenience.
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Judge Story, in his admirable Treatise on Promissory Notes and
Bills of Exchange, at page 132, forcibly states the doctrine as it now
stands supported by the highest authority in England and this
country, and by principles of soud reason and public policy. He
says : unless it be expressly otherwise agreed, the holder transferring
a note is uot exempt from all obligations and responsibilities, but
he incurs some, although they are of a limited nature. In the first
place he warrants by implication (unless otherwise agreed) that he
is a lawful holder and has a just and valid title to the instrument,
and a right to transfer it by delivery, for this is implied as aft
obligation of good faith.
In the next place, he warrants in like manner that the instrunent is genuine, and not forged or fictitious. (It will be found
stated, not as a part of the learned author's text, but inserted by the
editor in brackets, that the case of Baxter vs. Duren, in Maine
Reports, was decided otherwise.) But Judge Story does not adopt
or sanction the decision; on the contrary, refers in the notes to his
work to authorities directly in conflict with it.
Hard as in the present case the rule may operate, yet. it is the
only one which can determine with safety the duties and obligations
of parties to a transaction like this.
If the plaintiff and defendant acted as is conceded, in good faith
and in ignorance of the forgery, then the loss must fall on the vendor; he is nearest the inception of the transaction, and if acting as
principal, must be clearly liable, if he disposes or sells an invalid
bill or forged note ; or if acting as agent, he must be presumed to
know the party who employed him, and the circumstances of the case;
at all events, as principal or agent, he comes under an implied guarantee or warranty to the vendee of the genuineness of the papersold,
unless he discloses at the time his principal, if he acts as an agent.
Entertaining these views, I am of opinion that the defendant is
liable in this action, and that a verdict ought to be entered for the
plaintiffs here. I give the jury the following instruction:
That if they find from the evidence that the defendant sold to
the plaintiffs the paper offered in evidence by the plaintiffs, purporting to be the promissory note of Edward Dunn, in favor -and

